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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 O.C. Sorrells appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint.  On appeal, certain appellees have moved that we summarily 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal order.  For the reasons discussed below, we will 
grant the motion and will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint against all 
of the defendants. 
 Sorrells brought suit in the District Court7 against the Philadelphia Police 
Department, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, the Philadelphia Traffic 
Court, and the Philadelphia Parking Authority.  Sorrells alleged that he was unlawfully 
detained and that his vehicle was unlawfully confiscated on the ground that his vehicle’s 
license plates were obstructed.  The Philadelphia Police Department, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation, and the Philadelphia Traffic Court filed motions to dismiss 
the complaint; the Philadelphia Parking Authority, for its part, was never served.  After 
Sorrells failed to respond to the motions, the District Court granted each motion on the 
ground that it was uncontested, and on the alternative grounds that Sorrells had not sued 
proper, non-immune defendants.  The District Court also sua sponte dismissed the claims 
against the Philadelphia Parking Authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) on 
the ground that those claims were frivolous.  All dismissals were with prejudice.   
 Sorrells appealed.  On appeal, the Philadelphia Traffic Court filed a motion to 
summarily affirm, in which the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation subsequently 
joined.  Sorrells then filed a response opposing summary affirmance of the District 
Court’s dismissal of all of the defendants.  
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We apply the same de novo 
standard of review to the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) and to a sua sponte dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).  See, e.g., 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “[I]n deciding a motion to 
dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations . . . must be taken as true and interpreted in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.”  
McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).  
A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Because Sorrells proceeded 
pro se in the District Court, we construe his pleadings liberally.  See Haines v. Kerner, 
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).  We may summarily affirm a District Court’s order if the 
appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 There is no substantial question that in this case Sorrells cannot bring a federal 
civil rights action against the Philadelphia Police Department, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation, and the Philadelphia Traffic Court.  First, as the District 
Court correctly observed, the Philadelphia Police Department is not a proper party, as a 
suit against a municipal agency should name the municipality itself.  See Bonenberger v. 
Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e treat the municipality and its 
police department as a single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability.”).  But even 
construing Sorrells’ complaint as against the City of Philadelphia, Sorrells did not plead 
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that any municipal policy, custom, or practice led to the purported constitutional 
violations at issue, as a viable municipal liability claim requires.  See Connick v. 
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011). 
 Second, the District Court was also correct to conclude that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars the suit against the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the 
Philadelphia Traffic Court, because those are state entities.  See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 
661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981).  To attempt to overcome those entities’ sovereign 
immunity, Sorrells appears to argue that they were engaged in “commercial activity” of 
some kind.  But nothing in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), 
Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824), or any other 
case that Sorrells cites holds that sovereign immunity is lost simply because imposing 
fines is purportedly some manner of commercial activity, as Sorrells apparently argues.    
 There is also no substantial question that the District Court was correct to sua 
sponte dismiss the case against the Philadelphia Parking Authority.  A complaint will be 
dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “where it lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or in fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  
Sorrells’ asserted legal basis for the contention that the Philadelphia Parking Authority 
seized his vehicle illegally is that the relevant vehicle-registration-plate law did not apply 
to him because of his purported status as a “Moorish American National.”  That legal 
theory is indisputably meritless.  Cf. United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 
2015) (discussing a belief with “no legal support” that a defendant’s “ancestors came 
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from Africa, that he is therefore a Moorish national, and that as a result he need obey 
only those laws mentioned in an ancient treaty between the United States and 
Morocco.”); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 569 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The 
argument that Frazier–El sought to advance on his behalf (that the court lacked 
jurisdiction over him as a Moorish national) was indeed a frivolous one.”). 
 Finally, the District Court was also correct to dismiss the case with prejudice 
because the jurisdictional and pleading defects in this case are incurable.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
